Arizona

Constitutional Provisions:

Arizona cities above a population threshold of 3,500 people are empowered to adopt charters and become home rule cities. See Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 2 (“Any city containing, now or hereafter, a population of more than three thousand five hundred may frame a charter for its own government consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and the laws of the state.”); State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624, 626 (Ariz. 2021) (“Once ratified by the city’s voters and approved by the governor, the charter becomes the organic law of such city effectively, a local constitution.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Statutory Provisions:

Two provisions in Arizona’s statutes expand on and complement the state’s constitutional grant of authority to charter cities.

Under section 9-284, “[w]hen the charter has been framed, adopted and approved, and any of its provisions are in conflict with any law relating to cities…, the provisions of the charter shall prevail notwithstanding the conflict, and shall operate as a repeal or suspension of the law to the extent of conflict….” The same section clarifies that a city charter “shall be consistent with and subject to the state constitution, and not in conflict with the constitution and laws relating to the exercise of the initiative and referendum and other general laws of the state not relating to cities.” Id. In a recent opinion the Arizona Attorney General summarized case law interpreting the interplay of section 9-284 and the Arizona Constitution, collecting cases and concluding that this section, “since statehood … has been interpreted to allow charter cities … autonomy in areas solely their concern, while ensuring that matters of statewide concern are governed by state law.”¹ Moreover, “[a]n unbroken chain of cases has continued to apply this dichotomy.”² The case law section of this chapter identifies cases that discuss the distinction between matters of state and local concern.

Of Arizona’s ninety-one cities, nineteen are charter cities with charters adopted pursuant to the Arizona Constitution.³ One, the City of Tombstone, adopted a charter prior to statehood. Arizona’s charter cities include all of the state’s five largest cities: Phoenix, Tucson, Mesa, Chandler, and Glendale. Cities in the state that do not have charters operate as general law cities, which derive their authority to act directly from state law and not a locally adopted charter.⁴

Arizona courts generally find preemption wherever the state has expressly indicated its intent to eliminate local authority. However, limited categories of local actions—those “relat[ing] to purely municipal affairs”—are immune to state preemption.

Express Preemption: 

Express preemption occurs when the state includes explicit preemptive language in a state statute. For example, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-500.42 expressly preempts local governments from regulating blockchain technology: “A city or town may not prohibit or otherwise restrict an individual from running a node on blockchain technology in a residence.” Courts emphasize that the “legislative intent to preempt must be clear; a negative inference is insufficient.” City of Tucson v. Consumers For Retail Choice Sponsored by Wal-Mart, 5 P.3d 934, 937 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).

Field preemption: 

Field preemption occurs when a state statute expressly or impliedly occupies an entire legislative field, leaving no room for local regulation. To find that a state law has occupied the whole field in a certain area, courts consistently indicate that “[t]he existence of a preempting policy must be clear,” that “the assertedly competing provisions in question must be actually conflicting, rather than capable of peaceful coexistence,” and that “commonality of some aspect of subject matter is insufficient.” Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426, 432 (Ariz. 1994). While courts continue to recognize the possibility of field preemption—and have historically been willing to conclude that was the legislature’s intent—decisions from the past several decades reflect significant reluctance to conclude that the legislature intended to preempt a whole field of regulation.⁵

Conflict Preemption: 

Conflict preemption occurs when there is outright or actual conflict between state and local law. As with field preemption, to make such a finding, courts ask whether “the assertedly competing provisions in question [are] actually conflicting, rather than capable of peaceful coexistence . . . [and m]ere commonality of some aspect of subject matter is insufficient.” City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 790 P.2d 263, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 803 P.2d 891 (Ariz. 1990).

In Arizona, a charter city’s law can supersede state law if the city law is within an area of solely local concern. See Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 51 (Ariz. 1951) (“[A] city charter . . . supersede[s] all laws of the state in conflict with such charter provisions insofar as such laws relate to purely municipal affairs.”). But the only matters that courts have clearly held are solely local concerns are a “city’s manner and method of disposing of its real estate” and the “method and manner of conducting elections in the city.” State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624, 628–29 (Ariz. 2021). And where the subject of a city law touches on both local concerns and ones of statewide interest, state law prevails. See City of Tucson v. Consumers For Retail Choice Sponsored by Wal-Mart, 5 P.3d 934, 936 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (“[I]n matters of both local and statewide concern, a charter city’s ordinance is invalid if it conflicts with a valid state statute.”). Thus, a local government has limited protection from preemption under the test for matters of local concern.

In recent years, the Arizona legislature has adopted a wide variety of laws preempting local control over issues connected to climate change. Those include, as examples:

Building Electrification. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-467(C): “A municipality requiring the issuance of a building permit may not deny a permit application based on the utility provider proposed to provide utility service to the project.”

Building Electrification. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-810(B): “Any code . . . adopted by a municipality may not prohibit or have the effect of restricting a person’s or entity’s ability to use the services of a utility provider that is capable and authorized to provide utility service at a person’s or entity’s property.”

Building Electrification: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-321(C): “A county may not deny a permit application based on the utility provider proposed to provide utility service to the project.”

Building Electrification. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-867: “Any code . . . adopted by a county may not prohibit or have the effect of restricting a person’s or entity’s ability to use the services of a utility provider that is capable and authorized to provide utility service at a person’s or entity’s property.”

Appliance Emission Standards. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-810.01: “Any code, ordinance or general or specific plan provision or part of a code, ordinance or general or specific plan provision adopted by a municipality may not prohibit the use of refrigerants that are listed as acceptable pursuant to the clean air act (69 Stat. 322; 42 United States Code § 7671k) if the equipment used is listed and installed in accordance with the use conditions prescribed in the clean air act.”

Energy Use Benchmarking. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-500.36(A): “A city or town may not require an owner, operator or tenant of a business, commercial building or multifamily housing property to measure and report energy usage and consumption, including energy consumption benchmarking and building facility energy efficiency audits.”

Energy Use Benchmarking. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-269.14(A): “A county may not require an owner, operator or tenant of a business, commercial building or multifamily housing property to measure and report energy usage and consumption, including energy consumption benchmarking and building facility energy efficiency audits.”

Local Climate Adaptation. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 49-371(B): “A city, town or county may not regulate under this [local stormwater management-related] section any activity that does not discharge to a protected surface water.”

Plastic Containers. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-500.38: “A city or town may not . . . [r]egulate . . . reusable bags, disposable bags, boxes, beverage cans, bottles, cups and containers that are made out of cloth, plastic, extruded polystyrene, glass, aluminum, cardboard or other similar materials and that are used for transporting merchandise or food to or from a business or multifamily housing property.”

Plastic Containers. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-269.16: “A county may not . . . [r]egulate . . . reusable bags, disposable bags, boxes, beverage cans, bottles, cups and containers that are made out of cloth, plastic, extruded polystyrene, glass, aluminum, cardboard or other similar materials and that are used for transporting merchandise or food to or from a business or multifamily housing property.”

Regulatory Burdens Generally. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-841(A): “Unless authorized by federal, state or local law a city or town may not take any action that materially increases the regulatory burdens on a business unless there is a threat to the health, safety and welfare of the public that has not been addressed by legislation or industry regulation within the proposed regulated field.”

Penalties for Enacting Local Laws in Conflict with State Law. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-194.01 the state can withhold state shared revenue from a city that enacts and does not immediately repeal a local law in conflict with state law. Under the same section, the state’s attorney general can issue a finding that a local law may be in conflict with state law, triggering an Arizona Supreme Court review of the local law during which the city must post a bond equal to six months of its state shared revenue. Id.

Arizona courts recognize “local autonomy to exercise charter-granted authority over purely municipal concerns while preserving final state legislative authority over matters of joint municipal and statewide concern.” State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624, 627 (Ariz. 2021). The cases below demonstrate how Arizona courts have viewed municipal authority and the state’s power to preempt local ordinances. 

• State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 484 P.3d 624, 627 (Ariz. 2021): In Brnovich, the Supreme Court of Arizona considered an alleged conflict between a city’s charter provision requiring local elections to be held on specific dates and a state law requiring cities to consolidate state and local elections onto a different date. Id. at 625. For the narrow question considered here—whether “to hold municipal elections on cycle or off cycle is a matter of purely municipal concern”—the court concluded that if “a city’s charter authorizes the city to make that determination, state law cannot preempt the resulting decision.” Id. at 653. But the court emphasized that identifying matters of purely local concern is “often challenging” and that such matters “are few in number.” Id.

• City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 790 P.2d 263 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 803 P.2d 891 (Ariz. 1990): Arizona courts are reluctant to make a finding of field preemption if a state law leaves any topic unaddressed, even in an otherwise comprehensive statute. For example, the court considered a case involving an ordinance affecting a water pipeline owned by the City of Prescott but located within Town of Chino Valley. Id. at 271. Chino Valley passed an ordinance imposing a tax on any pipelines operating within the town, which applied to Prescott’s pipeline. Id. at 611–12. Prescott argued that the state’s Groundwater Management Act fully occupied the field of groundwater extraction and transport, leaving no space for Chino Valley’s tax. Id. at 616. The Court, despite “agree[ing] with Prescott that the Groundwater Management Act is markedly comprehensive legislation,” noted that the state could have chosen to expressly prohibit taxes like Chino Valley’s and declined to do so. Id. As a result, the court allowed the tax to stand, concluding that “a tax like the present one was not out of the realm of the foreseeable, and if the legislature had been of a mind to preclude any such tax, we believe it would have done so in appropriate terms.” Id.

• Jett v. City of Tucson, 882 P.2d 426 (Ariz. 1994): In Jett the court considered whether a state constitutional provision occupied the field of regulating municipal judges. Id. at 432–33 (Ariz. 1994). The state’s constitution allowed a statewide Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove a judge for misconduct; the city’s charter provided simply that judges could only be removed through a two-thirds vote of the city council. Id. at 429–30;see alsoAriz. Const. art. 6.1, § 4. After deciding the two provisions do not actually conflict, the court further concluded that because the legislature had only selected certain facets of judicial conduct to regulate, it had not evinced a clear intent to occupy this whole area of law. Id. at 433 (“[W]e will not infer from the fact that the Legislature has addressed some areas concerning the employment of magistrates, while remaining silent on others, an intent to preempt cities from authorizing in their city charters the removal of their magistrates from office.”).

Other Relevant Cases

Union Transportes de Nogales v. City of Nogales, 985 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1999) (“Preemption becomes an issue when the charter city legislates in contradiction to state law or over a subject that is in a ‘field’ already fully occupied by state law.”).

Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 51 (Ariz. 1951) (“[T]this court has uniformly held that a city charter, when regularly adopted and approved, becomes the organic law of the city and the provisions of the charter supersede all laws of the state in conflict with such charter provisions insofar as such laws relate to purely municipal affairs.”).

Tucson v. Consumers for Retail Choice, 5 P.3d 934, 937 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (“Even if a city ordinance on a matter of local and statewide concern does not conflict with a state statute, however, it may nevertheless be invalid if the state has appropriated the field.”).

Arizona has not adopted state-wide building or energy conservation codes. Local governments in the state adopt their own building codes. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-861. The overall scope of municipal authority to adopt building codes is not described in state law, but Arizona courts have generally construed that authority broadly. See, e.g., Washburn v. Pima County, 81 P.3d 1030, 1038 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“[B]uilding codes that affect the exercise of homeowners’ ‘personal, private, and aesthetic choices’ are a proper exercise of [municipal] police power.”). The City of Phoenix, for example, has incorporated by reference many of the 2018 versions of International Code Council (ICC) model codes with local amendments—including the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) and International Existing Building Code (IEBC).⁶ See Phoenix, Arizona Ordinance G-6463 (June 6, 2018).

State law does place several narrow limits on what local governments can regulate through their building codes. Most significantly, local governments cannot enforce rules that block access to particular types of utility service—they cannot ban new construction from using gas or require all-electric buildings, for example. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-867 (so-called “ban on [gas] bans” applicable to counties); § 9-810 (same applicable to cities and towns). 

State law allows Arizona to govern public utilities through the Arizona Corporation Commission but leaves municipalities free to manage their municipally-owned utilities free from the Commission’s oversight. Further, local governments enjoy significant authority to regulate how public utilities use municipal property. 

What is the relevant utility regulatory body in the state? Who and what does it regulate? The Arizona Corporation Commission is a constitutionally-formed body with jurisdiction to prescribe rates and conditions of service for all public utilities within the state. Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 3 (“The corporation commission shall have full power to, and shall, prescribe just and reasonable classifications to be used and just and reasonable rates and charges to be made and collected, by public service corporations within the state for service rendered therein, and make reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, by which such corporations shall be governed in the transaction of business within the state . . .”).

What authority, if any, do municipalities have over utilities? Local governments have very little authority over investor-owned utilities that are regulated by the Arizona Corporation Commission: they are largely limited to what control they may affect through franchise agreements. In contrast, municipalities are broadly empowered to operate and regulate their own utilities, and any such utilities are not subject to the Arizona Corporation Commission’s jurisdiction. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-511; Ariz. Const. art. XV, § 2. 

. Local governments can exercise more control over their streets. Under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-283(A), any utility’s use of public rights of way is “subject to control and regulation by the municipal authorities.” Further, the local government, “in granting a license or franchise, or at any time after it is granted, may impose restrictions and limitations upon the use of the public roads as it deems best for the public safety or welfare.” Id. at § 40-283(B).

Can cities enter into franchise agreements with utilities? Municipalities are authorized to enter into franchise agreements for public utility service. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-501. Franchise agreements cannot be for a term of longer than twenty-five years. Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 4 (“No municipal corporation shall ever grant, extend, or renew a franchise . . . for a longer time than twenty-five years.”). 

Does case law address whether the state public service law preempts local authority over utilities? The Supreme Court of Arizona has directly addressed the scope of the Arizona Corporation Commission’s preemption of local measures. In Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Town of Paradise Valley, a court considered whether an ordinance requiring power lines to be buried underground was valid in the face of the Corporation Commission’s seemingly pervasive power over public utilities. 610 P.2d 449, 451 (1980). The court, collecting and analyzing its cases on the topic, concluded that “the Corporation Commission’s paramount power is limited to rates, charges or classifications and that, as to all other matters, the legislature has the power to take what action it deems appropriate.” Id. at 451. Accordingly, statutes that expressly gave local governments zoning authority over utility poles and power lines were valid and not preempted by the Corporation Commission’s enabling provisions.

How can cities intervene in Arizona Corporation Commission proceedings? Arizona Corporation Commission rules allow any person “directly and substantially affected by the proceedings” to intervene in Commission cases. 14 Ariz. Admin. Code R14-3-105(A). Doing so requires the intervenor to apply for leave to intervene and be granted permission before a hearing, and the commission may deny an application where doing so would cause “the issues theretofore presented [to be] unduly broadened.” Id. at R14-3-15(B). 

Does the state have an obligation to serve statute? Yes, public utilities in Arizona are subject to a duty to serve all customers: “Every public service corporation shall furnish and maintain such service, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all respects adequate, efficient and reasonable.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 40-361(B).

Has the state passed enabling legislation for community choice aggregation (CCA)? No, Arizona has not passed enabling legislation for community choice aggregation. 

League of Arizona Cities and Towns, Charter Government Provisions in Arizona Cities (May 2015), https://perma.cc/3CCZ-VJRT (providing additional background on the forms of government adopted in Arizona cities’ charters).

National Association of Counties, Arizona County Government Overview (2022), https://perma.cc/T8FU-SNLT(providing demographic and legal background information specific to counties in Arizona).

In 2023 Arizona lawmakers introduced a bill aimed at removing cities’ option to establish a home rule charter altogether. The measure, SCR 1023 of 2023, would have repealed Article 13, section 2, of the Arizona constitution. The measure was narrowly rejected by senators indicating that they would have supported a slightly narrowed version of the same legislation.⁷ If the measure passed (or if a future version does), it would be subject to ratification by voters in the next general election. 

In early 2024 the Arizona Corporation Commission voted to draft “anti-ESG” rules that would repeal existing renewable energy mandates and energy efficiency programs for public utilities.⁸ As of December 2025 the rules appear not to have been drafted. 

While not a statute precluding local action per se, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 49-191 expressly forbids state agencies from creating or operating “a state or regional program to regulate the emission of greenhouse gas for the purposes of addressing changes in atmospheric temperature without express legislative authorization.” 

Under Ariz. Const. art. IV, § 1(8), voters in an Arizona city may call for referenda on legislation enacted within the city: “Under the power of the initiative fifteen percent of the qualified electors may propose measures on such local, city, town or county matters, and ten percent of the electors may propose the referendum on legislation enacted within and by such city, town or county.”