North Carolina

Constitutional Provisions:

North Carolina does not grant home rule authority through constitutional provisions. Instead, the state delegates the grant of municipal authority through statute. Article VII, section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution does, however, give the General Assembly the ability to establish local home rule, stating in part that, “[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the organization and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution, may give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable.”

Statutory Provisions:

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4: “It is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of the state should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect: Provided, that the exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174: “(a): A city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the city, and may define and abate nuisances.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-4: “It is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, functions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power.”

North Carolina cities are incorporated, and their charters created, through acts of the General Assembly. State law, however, delegates the power to amend a city charter to the city council or its voters. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-101–11. The charter provisions that can be amended are listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-101, which includes choosing the form of government and the mode of electing the city council.¹

North Carolina statutes delegating authority to local governments explicitly note that local laws are subject to express, field, and conflict preemption. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b)(2)–(5). 

Express Preemption: 

Under state statute, cities cannot enact an ordinance when the state has “expressly forbidden” the subject from local regulation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b)(4). For example, the General Assembly has expressly preempted local governments from regulating wage requirements: “The provisions of this Article supersede and preempt any ordinance, regulation, resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other political subdivision of the State that regulates or imposes any requirement upon an employer pertaining to compensation of employees, such as the wage levels of employees, hours of labor, payment of earned wages, benefits, leave, or well-being of minors in the workforce.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.1. 

Field Preemption:

Cities cannot enact an ordinance when the state has “clearly show[n] a legislative intent to provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion of local regulation,” in other words, when the state has occupied an entire field of regulation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b)(5). For example, the General Assembly has expressed its clear intent to occupy the entire regulatory field relating to firearms, thereby preempting local regulation of firearms: “[i]t is declared by the General Assembly that the regulation of firearms is properly an issue of general, statewide concern, and that the entire field of regulation of firearms is preempted from regulation by local governments except as provided by this section.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-409.40(a). Additional examples of field preemption are highlighted in Craig v. County of Chatham (discussed below), where the Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that the state Swine Farm Siting Act and the Animal Waste Management Systems regulation constituted a comprehensive regulatory scheme that preempted a county’s zoning ordinance for swine farms. 356 N.C. 40 (2002).

Conflict Preemption:

In North Carolina, “[a] city ordinance shall be consistent with the Constitution and laws of North Carolina and the United States.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b). Cities cannot enact an ordinance that “makes unlawful an act, omission, or condition which is expressly made lawful[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b)(2), nor “enact an ordinance that makes lawful an act, omission, or condition which is expressly made unlawful,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b)(3). 

Building Electrification. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-203.3: This law blocks cities from adopting an ordinance that prohibits, or has the effect of prohibiting, “(1) The connection, reconnection, modification, or expansion of an energy service based upon the type or source of energy to be delivered to an individual or any other person as the end-user of the energy service[, or] (2) The sale, purchase, or installation of an appliance utilized for cooking, space heating, water heating, or any other appliance included under the definition of “white goods” pursuant to G.S. 130A-290(a).”²

Oil & Gas Activities. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 113-415.1: This law makes preemptable any “local zoning or land-use ordinance [that] imposes[] requirements, restrictions, or conditions that are generally applicable” to oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities and prescribes the procedure and criteria by which North Carolina’s Oil and Gas Commission may preempt such ordinances. 

City and county ordinances must be consistent with the laws and constitutions of North Carolina and the United States. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174(b). But even despite N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4’s language indicating that courts should construe local authority broadly, judicial decisions have not been entirely consistent in their view of local authority. Compare Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37 (1994) (applying a rule of broad construction) with Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 810–11 (1999) (refusing to apply a rule of broad construction). One commenter has helpfully summarized that “North Carolina courts have generally recognized, albeit belatedly and inconsistently at times, that Dillon’s Rule no longer applies . . . [but a] local government may not use its general authority or a rule of broad construction to circumvent limitations specifically imposed by statute.”³ In BellSouth Telecommunications v. City of Laurinburg, the North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged the nuanced history of courts applying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A–4, but maintained that the line of cases implicating the statute were “consistent statements of law.” 168 N.C. App. 75, 82–83 (N.C. App. 2005). 

North Carolina’s Supreme Court has determined that the statutory requirement to broadly construe local power is a rule of statutory construction and not a “general directive” to give statutes broad constructions. SeeLanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 154 (N.C. 2012). Instead, courts should broadly construe statutes only when they are ambiguous, otherwise a plain and unambiguous statute should be given its plain meaning. Id.

In sum, cities in North Carolina can be understood to operate in a more constrained environment than many other home rule states. The cases below provide more detail on how North Carolina courts balance local authority derived from state statute against the state’s power to preempt “inconsistent” local laws:

• Schroeder v. City of Wilmington, 282 N.C. App. 558 (2022): The City of Wilmington enacted a zoning ordinance in January 2019 that, among other things, restricted short-term rentals through a registration and lottery process. Id. 562. The plaintiffs, who lost in the initial lottery, challenged the ordinance as beyond Wilmington’s authority and in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-424(c), which prohibits cities from requiring rental property registration. The trial court determined that Wilmington’s ordinance was “unambiguously” preempted. Id. at 564. On appeal, the court affirmed that the registration requirement was invalid but reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that other provisions of the law were severable and remained enforceable. Id. at 573.

• King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400 (2014): In 2012, the Town of Chapel Hill enacted an ordinance that aimed to minimize the adverse effects of nonconsensual towing, including adding storage and payment requirements and maximum fees for towed vehicles (Towing Ordinance). Id. at 402. Chapel Hill also passed an ordinance prohibiting adults from using a cellphone while driving a car on public streets or in a “vehicular area” (Mobile Phone Ordinance). Id. at 402–03. The plaintiff operated a towing business in Chapel Hill and sought declaratory judgment to invalidate both ordinances, arguing that Chapel Hill lacked authority to enact either. To determine whether each was preempted, the Supreme Court’s analysis was guided by the proposition that looking toward the plain language of a statute is the first step in “ascertain[ing] the extent of a legislative grant of power.” Id. at 404–05. The court determined that, based on the municipal police powers (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174) and its broad construction of that statute, municipalities have the general power to regulate nonconsensual towing to protect citizen health, safety, and welfare, but that certain provisions of the ordinance (like the prohibition on charging credit card fees) exceeded that power. Id. at 407–09. Regarding the Mobile Phone Ordinance, the court concluded, based on the state’s existing regulation of motor vehicles, that the General Assembly “inten[ded] to provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion of local regulation.” Id. at 412.

• State v. Williams, 283 N.C. 550 (1973): In this case the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether a local ordinance that made drinking alcoholic beverages in public places illegal was “consistent with the general laws of North Carolina.” Id. at 551–52. The local ordinance included beer among the alcoholic beverages it regulated, and under that provision the defendants had been arrested for openly possessing beer on a public street. Id. at 550. State law did not define beer as an alcoholic beverage though, and the state law’s implementing regulation permitted the personal use of beer “without restriction.” Id. at 554. Accordingly, the court ruled that state law preempted the local rule because (1) the local ordinance restricted what state law permitted by prohibiting the consumption of alcohol in public; and (2) the state had provided a “complete and integrated regulatory” scheme with respect to alcoholic beverages (i.e., the state had field preempted the local law).

Other Relevant Cases

Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40 (2002) (concluding that state swine farm regulations comprised a “complete and integrated regulatory scheme” on a statewide basis, thus preempting local ordinances).

Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 154 (2012) (holding that a county’s residential development ordinance was beyond its authority and explaining that “[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning”) (cleaned up).

Town of Washington v. Hammond, 76 N.C. 33, 36 (1877) (holding that state law preempted an ordinance that made certain property damage a misdemeanor and expressing that “[t]he true principle is that municipal by-laws and ordinances must be in harmony with the general laws of the State, and whenever they come in conflict with the general laws, the by-laws and ordinances must give way”).

Building codes in North Carolina are governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143. Under the statute, the North Carolina Building Code Council (BCC) adopts codes applicable statewide, periodically updates those codes, and holds at least one public hearing for each update. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138. The codes currently in place are primarily the 2018 versions of the International Code Council (ICC) model codes.⁴ The implementation of the 2024 statewide building code has been postponed, as detailed in a letter from the State Fire Marshal.⁵ State law does not explicitly allow for local amendments to the state code, but it does allow a municipality to adopt local fire prevention codes and local floodplain management regulations. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138(e). Local floodplain regulations are only enforceable if they are approved by the BCC. Id. 

In 2024, however, North Carolina passed a law that largely freezes updates to the state Residential Building Code, as well as residential portions of the Energy, Fuel Gas, and Mechanical Codes, until the first full six-year revision becomes effective on January 1, 2031. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138(d). This does not preclude local governments from adopting fire prevention codes and floodplain management regulations. Some amendments, including a special review of energy, fuel gas, and mechanical codes applicable to residential construction, still had to be completed by January 1, 2026.

What is the relevant utility regulatory body in the state? Who and what does it regulate? The North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) regulates the rates of investor-owned utilities. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 62-2, -3(23). There are three investor-owned energy utilities operating in North Carolina: Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Progress, and Dominion Energy.⁶ NCUC does not regulate the rates of municipally-owned electric utilities or rural electric cooperatives, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-3(23)(d), and has limited authority over them.⁷ Part of the NCUC’s authority includes overseeing compliance with North Carolina’s Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (CEPS) for all electric suppliers. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 62-133.8, 62-133.9. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) provides power to two small areas in western North Carolina.⁸

What authority, if any, do municipalities have over utilities? The state has delegated to the NCUC practically all control over public utilities. While municipalities have the power to adopt reasonable zoning regulations that promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the community, in at least one case such regulation has been overridden by the NCUC’s “authority and duty to compel the provision of adequate services at reasonable rates[.]” State ex rel. Utilities Comm’n. v. Town of Kill Devil Hills, 670 S.E.2d 341, 347 (N.C. App. 2009).

Can cities enter into franchise agreements with utilities? Yes, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-319, municipalities have the authority to grant franchises with utilities for a period not to exceed sixty years. See also Duke Power Co. v. City of High Point, 205 S.E. 2d 774, 781 (N.C. App. 1974).

Further, an electric utility “has power to contract with any person or corporation, the owner of any lands or of any franchise or easement therein, over which its lines are proposed to be erected, for the right-of-way for planting, repairing and preservation of its poles or other property, and for the erection and occupation of offices at suitable distances for the public accommodation . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-182. On the other hand, a public right-of-way, such as a public street, becomes “immediately available for use by any public utility” after “recordation of a subdivision map or plat reflecting its dedication.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-182.1.

How can cities intervene in Utilities Commission proceedings? Under the NCUC Rules, “[a]ny person having an interest in the subject matter of any hearing or investigation pending before the Commission may become a party thereto . . . by filing a verified petition with the Commission giving . . . [among other things] [a] clear and concise statement of the nature of the petitioner’s interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, and the way and manner in which such interest is affected by the issues involved in the proceeding [and a] statement of the exact relief desired.” NCUC Rules, R1-19. (cleaned up) However, intervention may be limited where a party’s interests “are adequately represented by existing parties” or where intervention “will cause undue delay or prejudice.” Id.

Does the state have an obligation to serve statute? Yes, North Carolina’s obligation to serve statute states that “[e]very public utility shall furnish adequate, efficient, and reasonable service.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-131(b).

Has the state passed enabling legislation for community choice aggregation (CCA)? No, North Carolina currently lacks enabling legislation for community choice aggregation programs.⁹

David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs: Dillon’s Rule, Legislative Reform, and the Current State of Affairs in North Carolina, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671, 699 (2000), https://perma.cc/VUV4-FDYB (tracing the evolution in legislative intent and judicial review of the state’s delegation of authority to local governments after adopting a rule of broad construction for some local governmental powers and implications for local government authority).

Alexandra Franklin, See Green: North Carolina’s Clean Energy Plan, the Social Cost of Carbon, and a Way Forward Under a Least-Cost Framework, 99 N.C. L. Rev. F. 59 (2021), https://perma.cc/XN6K-FCGH(providing background on utility commissions in traditionally regulated states and North Carolina’s utility commission, and analyzing how North Carolina’s public utility system must adapt to accommodate the state’s Clean Energy Plan).

North Carolina residents can adopt or amend city charters through local ballot initiatives. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-104. An initiative petition must have the signatures of a “number of qualified voters of the city equal to at least ten percent (10%) of the whole number of voters who are registered to vote in city elections according to the most recent figures certified by the State Board of Elections or 5,000, whichever is less.” Id.