Ohio

Constitutional Provisions:

Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 7: “Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government.”

Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 3: “[M]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” This section delegates both home rule authority and the police power. The third clause, “in conflict with general laws,” modifies the second clause, but not the first clause. In other words, municipalities that exercise the police power cannot conflict with the general laws of the state.

Statutory Provisions:

Ohio appears to have not expanded on constitutional home rule authority or police power in statutes.

Hundreds of cities in Ohio have adopted city charters, including the six most populous municipalities: Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, and Dayton. Non-chartered cities legislating on matters of local self-government are limited by whether the exercise of a power is a substantive exercise of power or a procedural exercise of power. A non-chartered city may “enact an ordinance which is at variance with state law in matters of substantive local self-government,” but for procedural matters of local self-government, they must adhere to state law. See Northern Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio St. 2d 375, 378, 382 (Ohio 1980); see also Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447 (1954). There is currently no clear judicial rule on whether a matter of local self-government is procedural or substantive. For example, state law has prevailed where a non-chartered village did not comply with state law procedure for adopting zoning ordinances. Morris, 162 Ohio St. In State ex rel. Ziegler v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, Ohio’s Supreme Court invalidated a Fairfax Village ordinance because it set qualifications for village council members that deviated from qualifications set at the state level. 621 N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio 1993). In contrast to non-chartered cities, a chartered city’s exercise of either a procedural or substantive power of local self-government prevails over a conflicting state statute. See Leavers v. City of Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33 (Ohio 1964).

Ohio city charters typically claim the fullest extent of municipal home rule powers. For example, the Columbus City Charter describes its powers with the following language: “[Columbus] shall have all powers that now are, or hereafter may be granted to municipalities by the constitution or laws of Ohio . . . .”

Case law in Ohio suggests that courts recognize conflict preemption and possibly field preemption. See, e.g.,Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 175 (Ohio 2006) (“[C]ourts should consider the [statewide-concern doctrine] when deciding whether . . . a comprehensive statutory plan is, in certain circumstances, necessary to promote the safety and welfare of all the citizens of this state.”). But across different types of preemption, the Canton test (described below) has become the primary home rule analysis tool for Ohio courts, rendering the state’s preemption framework somewhat of an anomaly among the other states in this report.

Ordinances related to matters of local self-government are generally not preemptable, whereas ordinances that are exercises of the local police power can be. In City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149 (Ohio 2002), Canton extended a prohibition on using mobile homes for residential purposes to include manufactured homes. In response, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a law barring political subdivisions from restricting the location of permanently sited manufactured homes in zones where single-family homes were permitted. Id. at 150. Canton challenged the law as an unconstitutional infringement on its municipal home rule authority under the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Canton and solidified the prevailing framework of analysis under Ohio law for disputes around home rule authority. Id. at 153. If a state statute is deemed a general law, the local law is preempted only if it conflicts with that general law. Thus, for a local law to be preempted by a state law: (1) the state law must be in conflict with the municipal ordinance; (2) the ordinance must be an exercise of the police power, rather than local self-government; and (3) the statute must be a general law. Id. at 151. The court further scrutinized the third prong, noting that “to constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations [that serve an overriding state interest], rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Id. at 152–53. The Court held that the challenged statute was an attempt to limit municipal lawmaking by limiting the ability of Ohio political subdivisions to control their communities’ zoning. Id. at 157.

Following Canton, in general, local enactments related to “the power of local self-government” are immune from state preemption. See Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 174 (Ohio 2006). As noted by a 2024 brief for the Ohio General Assembly, the scope of “all powers related to self-government” does not carry a judicial definition, but the Ohio Supreme Court in 1958 stated that local self-government authority “relates solely to the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality.” Village of Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections, 148 N.E. 2d 921 (Ohio 1958). Courts have found several subject areas to be matters of local self-government, including improving, leasing, and conveying municipal property, Dies Electric Co. v. Akron, 62 Ohio St. 2d 322 (1980), and the manner and method of municipal expenditures, State ex rel. Cronin v. Wald, 26 Ohio St. 2d 22 (1971), among others.

Separately, local governments’ power to adopt and enforce ordinances that are exercises of the police power granted under Section 3 of Article XVIII is limited only to the extent they are in conflict with a general law of the state. As the Ohio Supreme Court clarified in 2017, “a local ordinance is preempted only when a general law of the state directly conflicts with it . . . A conflict exists if the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, or vice versa.” State ex rel. Rocky Ridge Dev., L.L.C. v. Winters, 151 Ohio St. 3d 39, 42–43 (Ohio 2017) (internal quotations omitted).

Building Electrification. Ohio Rev. Code § 4933.1: This bars cities from enacting prohibitions on the use of natural gas in buildings. Municipalities may not “enact any ordinance or resolution or promulgate or impose any building code, contractual provision, or other requirement that limits, prohibits, or prevents residential, commercial, or industrial consumers within their boundaries from using the following: [d]istribution service or retail natural gas service. . . [and] propane” (internal numbering and punctuation omitted).

Plastic Bags. Ohio Rev. Code § 715.013(B): Under this law, “[n]o municipal corporation may impose any tax, fee, assessment, or other charge on auxiliary containers [i.e., plastic bags], on the sale, use, or consumption of such containers, or on the basis of receipts received from the sale of such containers.” Another related law states that “a person may use an auxiliary container for purposes of commerce or otherwise.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3736.021.

Education. Enact Ohio Higher Education Enhancement Act of 2023, S.B. 83, 135 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2023) (failed): This bill contained a wide-ranging set of rules for public colleges and universities that might have changed the way climate policies are discussed in higher education.

Since 2002, the Canton test has been the usual judicial tool to determine whether state law improperly infringes on municipal power under the Home Rule Amendment. Courts in Ohio have tended to restrict home rule authority using the Canton test, “frequently rul[ing] in favor of the state” in home rule cases.¹ Even still, the test has been criticized as being applied inconsistently and unpredictably.² In other words, the tendency of courts applying the Canton test to favor state authority over municipal power is a good, but not certain, predictor of whether any particular state law will overrule local authority.

The cases below demonstrate how Ohio courts balance local control described in the state’s Home Rule Amendment against the state’s power to supersede local legislation.

• Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006): The Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether predatory lending was a “proper subject for regulation by local ordinance.” Id. at 778. In 2002, Ohio’s General Assembly enacted Substitute House Bill No. 386, 149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6938, which was intended to regulate predatory lending. Id. Subsequently, the city of Cleveland enacted Cleveland Codified Ordinance 659.02, which prohibited “any predatory loan” as defined in the local ordinance. Id. at 779. In response, American Financial Services Association filed a complaint alleging that Cleveland’s predatory loan ordinances conflicted with state statutes related to predatory lending. Id. The key question on appeal was whether the state statutes were general laws, and if so, whether Cleveland’s ordinances conflicted with them. In ruling that the state laws preempted Cleveland’s ordinances, the court noted that “‘[i]t is a fundamental principle of Ohio law that, pursuant to the “statewide concern” doctrine, a municipality may not, in the regulation of local matters, infringe on matters of general and statewide concern.’” Id. at 781–82. The court went on to state that the statewide concern doctrine fits neatly within the Canton test and that courts should engage in the doctrine when deciding whether “a comprehensive statutory plan is, in certain circumstances, necessary to promote the safety and welfare of all citizens of the state.” Id. at 782. Finally, in its conflict analysis, the court summarized the state’s jurisprudence with respect to the conflict analysis prong of the Canton test, concluding that “any local ordinances that seek to prohibit conduct that the state has authorized are in conflict with the state statutes and are therefore unconstitutional.” Id. at 785.

• State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 143 Ohio St. 3d 271 (Ohio 2015): This case examined whether Munroe Falls’ local zoning ordinances could regulate oil and gas drilling operations despite state law granting exclusive regulatory authority to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). Id. at 272. The City of Munroe Falls argued that its zoning laws, which required local permits and notifications for oil and gas wells, should apply to drilling within its borders. However, Beck Energy contended that under Ohio Revised Code section 1509.02, ODNR had “sole and exclusive authority” to regulate oil and gas drilling, preempting local control. Id. at 272. In its Canton analysis, the court first determined that the city’s ordinance was an exercise of the police power rather than local self-government, and that section 1509.02 is a general law. Id. at 275–77. Focusing on the second prong of the general law test, the court determined that the state statute set a comprehensive framework for regulating the location, permitting, and operation of oil and gas wells that applied uniformly throughout the state, to the exclusion of local governmental control. Id. Finally, rounding out the Canton test, the court found that the local ordinances conflicted with the state statute in two ways. Id. at 277–80. First, they attempted to impose additional local requirements—by prohibiting what section 1509.02 allows. Id. at 277. Second, Munroe Falls’ ordinances conflicted with the state’s regulatory scheme because the language of the state demonstrated that the state “intended to preempt local regulation.” Id. at 279. Therefore, the court concluded that R.C. 1509.02 preempted Munroe Falls’ ordinances regulating oil and gas drilling.

• Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923): After two residents were convicted of violating local liquor laws of the Village of Struthers and the City of Youngstown, on appeal the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether the municipal ordinances were in conflict with general laws. In affirming the trial court judgment in each case, the court recognized in its conflict analysis that “[n]o real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right which the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa.” Sokol, 140 N.E. at 521.

Other Relevant Cases:

City of Dayton v. State, 151 Ohio St. 3d 168 (Ohio 2017) (finding that state statutes passed to regulate municipal use of traffic control devices violated the Home Rule Amendment because the statutes only limited municipal legislative authority without also serving an “overriding state interest”).

Cleveland v. State, 138 Ohio St. 3d 232 (Ohio 2014) (state statute granting the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio authority to regulate towing companies included explicit preemptive language was held to be an unconstitutional limit on municipal authority in direct contradiction of the Home Rule Amendment’s language).

These cases, particularly Canton and American Financial Services Association illustrate the core tension between municipalities exercising their police power and authority over purely local affairs and courts’ ability to view issues affecting local government as matters of statewide concern.

Recent and Ongoing Litigation

On April 9, 2024, a group of fourteen chartered cities filed a complaint in Franklin County Court of Common Pleas challenging a state law³ that would have preempted municipalities from regulating tobacco use. Governor DeWine initially vetoed the law before a Republican supermajority in the Ohio General Assembly overruled that veto. On May 23, 2024, the court issued an order that declared in part that section 9.681 was “an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of the Plaintiff municipalities to exercise their right to Home Rule pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution,” and permanently enjoined the law. The state filed a notice of appeal on May 29, 2024.⁴ On July 8, 2025, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The state filed a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court on August 12, 2025.

On January 27, 2023, the City of Cincinnati challenged Ohio’s firearm preemption statute, which was amended in 2018 and 2022. In a previous challenge predating those amendments, the state’s earlier preemption statute was upheld as “a general law that displaces municipal firearm ordinances and does not constitutionally infringe on municipal home-rule authority.”⁵ In the 2023 case a trial court initially ruled in favor of Cincinnati; but in June 2024, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the firearm preemption amendments satisfied the Canton test. Accordingly, local firearm regulation in conflict with the statute is preempted. The court remanded the case back to the trial court.

Ohio has adopted a statewide building code, which sets the floor for building construction requirements. Ohio Rev. Code § 3781.10. Municipalities may enact additional local regulations alongside the state building code, so long as they do not directly conflict with the Ohio Building Code or other state law. Ohio Rev. Code § 3781.01; see also City of Springdale v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 59 Ohio St. 3d 56, 59 (Ohio 1991). Local additions to the building code conflict with state rules “only when standards prohibit that which state allows or require that which state prohibits.” See City of Middleburg Heights v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards, 65 Ohio St. 3d 510, 515 (Ohio 1992). For example, residential solar systems must conform to both state and local building codes where applicable. See Residential Code of Ohio, § 2301.

Ohio has adopted versions of the codes issued by the International Code Council (ICC).⁶ The Ohio Building Code is an amended version of the 2021 edition of the International Building Code (IBC). Ohio’s Energy Code is an amended version of the 2021 edition of the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC). The state has also adopted an amended version of the 2018 edition of the International Residential Code.⁷ Ohio has adopted amended versions of the 2021 editions of other ICC published codes.

What is the relevant utility regulatory body in the state? Who and what does it regulate? The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regulates natural gas and electricity investor-owned utilities (among others), but does not regulate municipally-owned utilities. See Ohio Rev. Code § 4905.04; Ohio Rev. Code § 4905.02(A)(3). PUCO is solely responsible for regulating rates and public utility service, and has the exclusive authority to adjudicate formal complaints between utilities and customers. Id.; Ohio Rev. Code § 4905.26.

What authority, if any, do municipalities have over utilities? Municipalities have limited authority over electric utilities because the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over competitive retail electric service and most utility regulatory matters. See Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. v. City of Hamilton, 117 N.E.3d 1 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. 2018) (quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Com. Pleas, 88 Ohio St. 3d 447 (Ohio 2000)) (PUCO has “exclusive jurisdiction over various matters involving public utilities, such as rates and charges, classifications, and service, effectively denying to all Ohio courts (except [the supreme court]) any jurisdiction over such matters.”).

Still, cities do have options to influence or take control of their energy systems. They have control of their streets, can intervene in PUCO proceedings, and can municipalize their power systems: “Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or without its corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for any such product or service. The acquisition of any such public utility may be by condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full title to, the property and franchise of any company or person supplying to the municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such utility.” Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 4.

Can cities enter into franchise agreements with utilities? Yes, cities can enter into franchise agreements with utilities. See Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 4; see also Village of Lucas v. Lucas Loc. Sch. Dist., 442 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Ohio 1982). Under Ohio Rev. Code § 4939.03(C)(1) no electric or gas utility “shall occupy or use a public way without first obtaining any requisite consent of the municipal corporation owning or controlling the public way” (cleaned up).

How can cities intervene in Public Utilities Commission proceedings? Cities can intervene upon a timely motion showing that: “(1) A statute of this state or the United States confers a right to intervene. (2) The person has a real and substantial interest in the proceeding, and the person is so situated that the disposition of the proceeding may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his or her ability to protect that interest, unless the person’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Ohio Admin. Code § 4901-1-11(A).

Does the state have an obligation to serve statute? Yes, Ohio’s obligation to serve statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 4905-22, states: “Every public utility shall furnish necessary and adequate service and facilities, and every public utility shall furnish and provide with respect to its business such instrumentalities and facilities, as are adequate and in all respects just and reasonable.”

Has the state passed enabling legislation for community choice aggregation (CCA)? Yes, municipalities may create electricity aggregation programs with “opt-in” or “opt-out” provisions for their consumers. Ohio Rev. Code § 4928.20. Governmental aggregators purchase electricity for its members and leverages the aggregate demand of its member-group to negotiate electricity prices. For example, the City of Columbus established “Clean Energy Columbus” in 2020, a CCA program designed to support local clean energy for city residents and small businesses.

Matthew Mahoney, Home Rule in Ohio: General Laws, Conflicts, and the Failure of the Courts to Protect the Ohio Constitution, 67 Clev. St. L. Rev. 113 (2019), https://perma.cc/83T9-8M59 (student note examining the history and judicial interpretation of Ohio’ Home Rule Amendment and offering alternatives to current interpretive tools).

In at least one case, the State of Ohio has attempted to make the argument that it could penalize nonconforming home rule municipalities into compliance by “encouraging” municipalities “to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner.” The court did not reach the merits of that claim, however. City of Toledo v. State, 72 N.E.3d 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017), rev’d 2018 WL 3062477 (Ohio. Sup. Ct. 2018).